Towards a Contract Service Provider Model for Virtual Assets and VASPs by Hardjono, Thomas et al.
Towards a Contract Service Provider Model
for Virtual Assets and VASPs
Thomas Hardjono Alexander Lipton Alex Pentland
MIT Connection Science & Engineering
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, MA 02139, USA
hardjono@mit.edu alexlip@mit.edu pentland@mit.edu
September 15, 2020
Abstract
We introduce the contract service provider (CSP) model as an analog of the success-
ful Internet ISP model. Our exploration is motivated by the need to seek alternative
blockchain service-fee models that departs from the token-for-operations (gas fee) model
for smart contracts found on many popular blockchain platforms today. A given CSP
community consisting of multiple CSP business entities (VASPs) form a contract domain
which implement well-defined contract primitives, policies and contract-ledger. The nodes
of the members of CSP community form the blockchain network. We discuss a number
of design principles borrowed from the design principles of the Internet Architecture, and
we discuss the interoperability of cross-domain (cross-chain) transfers of virtual assets in
the context of contract domains.
Keywords: Blockchains, smart contracts, virtual assets, contract service providers, con-
tract domains.
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1 Introduction
The recent rise in the cost of transactions on Bitcoin and Ethereum illustrates the reality
that the virtual asset industry is still in its nascency and that further consideration needs to
be placed on the long-term feasibility of the tokenized operations model (i.e. gas fee model).
The gas-fee model has a number of unintended side effects, including platform capture of end-
users, unsafe smart contracts and the lack of incentives to solve the blockchain interoperability
problem [1, 2].
In this paper we explore the notion of a contract service provider (CSP) model as an
analog of the decades-old Internet Service Provider (ISP) model that has enabled the Internet
to expand and flourish. Our CSP model is driven by a number of design principles that
borrow from the design principles of the Internet Architecture [3, 4]. We discuss these design
principles towards the end of the paper in order to first discuss the CSP model.
We seek to make the paper readable to a wide audience, and as such have sought to limit
the usage of technical jargon. However, we assume the reader is at least familiar with Bitcoin,
cryptocurrencies, and distributed ledgers generally.
2 Contract Service Providers: Motivations
A Contract Service Provider (CSP) is a regulated service provider who collaborates with other
CSPs in making available on distributed nodes one or more smart contract primitives that
consists of simple operations applicable to certain virtual assets issued by an authoritative
legal entity. Collectively, the group of CSPs offers contract services to one or more regulated
customers, which may include individuals and organizations. The contract primitives and
the supported types of assets are chosen by the CSPs prior to deployment, and the set of
primitives are not user-programmable. The goal of the contract service is to execute fixed set
of functions on virtual assets, as invoked by the customers of the CSPs. As such, the CSP
paradigm is similar to the Function as a Service (FaaS) model [5].
There are number of motivations for the contract service paradigm:
• Alternative fee-for-service business model: The contract service model provides an op-
portunity for a classic fee-for-service model for processing transfers of different types
of regulated virtual assets. Since the primitives are simple and since the blockchain
is not user-programmable, there is a deterministic and predictable cost for a service
provider to participate in a CSP group. The CSPs determine the operating rules of
the community, the amount of computing resources each CSP must put forward, and
the CSPs can monitor each other with regards to the performance of the contractual
obligations of members of the CSP community.
This approach is a departure from the gas fee model used in the Ethereum platform [6]
where the price of the Ether has been shown to fluctuate dramatically depending on
the popularity of certain contracts (e.g. DeFi [7, 8]) and where the overall throughput
of the blockchain may be affected by popular contracts (e.g. CryptoKitty [9, 10])
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that negatively influence the availability of other contracts unrelated to the popular
contracts.
• Reduction of fees by separation of business logic from contract primitives: Enabling
end-users to freely program complex code logic directly on the blockchain nodes using
a fully-fledged object language (e.g. Solidity [11]) fulfills the intended goal of many
platform providers, namely platform capture of customers. The more complex the code
logic, the more operations consumed and the higher the total gas fees obtained overall
by the platform owners. However, as the fees climb higher this encourages Ponzi-like
schemes where new entrants boost the profits of existing participants by driving demand
for tokens [12].
Platform capture disincentivize interoperability of blockchain networks, and results in
delays in the broad adoption of smart contracts technologies by the financial sector.
Other negative side effects of on-chain complex code designs is the higher likelihood of
human error and intentional abusive programming (e.g. DAO Hack due to reentrancy
vulnerabilities [13, 14, 15]).
• Support for interoperability across blockchain systems: The use of simple contract prim-
itives for specific types of assets generally lends itself more readily for interoperability
of blockchain systems. When two blockchain systems employ semantically equivalent
constructions of contract-primitives – albeit using different syntaxes (different program-
ming languages) – with their ledgers capturing comparable data structures representing
similar transactional behaviors, this results in the higher likelihood of business interop-
erability across blockchain systems based on technical interoperability.
3 Overview of Design Principles and Terminology
The following is a summary of the terminology we use in the current work, with further
expansion in the following sections:
• Contract Service: Smart contract services defined by the set of primitive operations
implemented on-chain and the asset-types processed through the primitives.
• Contract Service Provider (CSP): A regulated service provider (e.g. registered business)
that participates in making available contract services to its customers.
• CSP Community: A group of CSPs offering contract services on a blockchain network
consisting of their nodes.
• Contract Domain: The various computing resources required to implement a contract
service, including contract-specific functional components (i.e. primitives, contract-
ledger, consensus algorithm and domain policies) and the other technological constructs
that implement the domain.
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• Virtual Asset Service Provider (VASP): Entity dealing with virtual assets covered under
the FATF definition for virtual assets and the Travel Rule (see [16, 17]).
The contract service provider (CSP) model is based on the following design principles
that takes into account code complexity considerations and the provider’s deployment con-
siderations:
(a) Contract simplicity principle: Each smart contract should implement a simple and
modular well-defined function, following classic object-oriented design principles. This
is also referred to as the decentralized primitives principle.
(b) Constrained authorship principle: Each contract must be made available only by a
contract service provider (CSP) entity within the group of CSPs.
(c) Node diversity principle: A contract service blockchain network must employ a diverse
node-technology implementations and be owned/operated by a diverse set of providers.
(d) Mediated oracle principle: Any representation of value that originates from outside the
contract service (contract domain) must enter (be introduced) into the contract service
through the mediation of a contract service provider.
(e) Opaque ledgers assumption: Any cross-chain or cross-domain asset transfer protocol
must be designed based on the assumption that the ledgers of the respective blockchains
are not externally readable/writeable.
We discuss the design principles in more in detail in Section 7.
4 Contract Service and CSP Communities
We define a CSP community as a group of regulated contract service providers offering asset-
related smart contract services on a blockchain network whose nodes are composed of the
computing resources of the members of the CSP community. The notion of a community
is contract-centric in that the CSPs in a community agree to allocate computing resources
for a given smart contract service. A given CSP community may be constituted to provide
contract services for a single smart contract or for several related smart contracts on the
same blockchain network. A contract service is defined by the set of contract primitives
implemented on-chain and the asset-types processed through those primitives. An entity
(individual or organization) is considered to be a regulated customer of a CSP by virtue
of purchasing access to the smart contract services through that CSP. For a given contract
service, an entity should be a customer of one CSP only in the CSP community. The CSP
community must clearly define beforehand the contract primitives and the asset-types that
constitute the contract-service, in order to prevent confusion on the part of customers.
From a legal perspective, a CSP community must be founded on a legal contractual
agreement that defines the obligations and liabilities of each of the members to the community
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Figure 1: Simple example of three (3) CSP communities viewed from a contract-centric
perspective
and to the customers of members. The community defines a service level agreement (SLA)
for the customers of the members. This approach is akin to multi-lateral peering agreements
used by Internet Service Providers (ISPs), which defines common data routing responsibilities
across multiple networks.
A simple example of three (3) CSP communities is shown in Figure 1. Community C1
are CSPs providing contract service SCS1, the Community C2 providing contract service
SCS2, while Community C3 the contract service SCS3. The CSP X is active in all three
communities, where in each case it makes available computing resources (nodes) to each
community. In two cases (the intersection areas of Figure 1) the CSP X is using contract
multi-tenancy on the same nodes.
4.1 The Contract Domain
We use the notion of the contract domain in order to reason more accurately about the
various technical and implementation aspects of a contract service, including access to the
components of the contract service (e.g. contract calling APIs, ledger, etc). A contract
domain is defined by a CSP community through a combination of the following: (i) the
set of contract-primitives that constitute the contract service together with the contract
ledger and consensus algorithm for the ledger; (ii) the policies regarding the asset types
permitted to be transacted in the jurisdiction of operation of the CSP community; (iii) the
nodes infrastructure that implements the contract-primitives and enforces policies. This is
shown in Figure 2. For simplicity, we use the term domain functions in a domain to refer
to the technical components (i.e. contract-primitives, contract-ledger, consensus algorithm
and domain policies) and the other technological constructs that implement the domain (e.g.
membership management, asset validation, etc).
A contract domain coincides with the CSP community in that both represent the same
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Figure 2: Overview of a contract domain
participating business entities (e.g. CSPs) and the resources (i.e nodes) dedicated by the
business entities to establish the contract service. Thus, for business reasons a given CSP
entity may be member of different CSP communities simultaneously at any given moment,
where it allocates the computing resources required for each community (e.g. minimal M
nodes). In each community, the contract domain structure ensures that a separate ledger
and consensus mechanism is used to record the asset transactions in that contract domain.
Figure 3 illustrates a case in which some CSPs are participating in several contract domains
simultaneously. For example, CSP-A is participating contract-domains CD1, CD2 and CD3,
while CSP-C is participating in domains CD2 and CD3 only. This means that CSP-A, CSP-B
and CSP-C share a common contract-ledger for CD3 and jointly participate in the consensus
mechanism to maintain that contract-ledger. The CSP-A, CSP-C and CSP-D a common
contract-ledger for domain CD2.
There are several aspects worth noting about a contract domain and the resources (nodes)
implementing the contract domain:
• Per contract-domain consensus algorithm and decentralized ledger: The nodes that im-
plement the contract service in a domain employ a separate consensus algorithm and
contract-ledger specifically for that the contract service. The choice of consensus algo-
rithm and form of the ledger blocks is defined by the CSP community through their
formative the legal agreements.
Thus, in Figure 3 there is a separate ledger for contract service SCS1, SCS2 and SCS3.
The provider CSP A participates in maintaining three (3) separate ledger for each of
these three contract-domains.
• Opaque ledgers and contracts to non-customers: When a customer obtains services from
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Figure 3: Illustration of CSP participation in several contract domains
a CSP who is a member of a CSP community, the customer has visibility only into the
relevant resources (e.g. contract ledger) for that CSP community. This follows from the
opaque ledgers principle (described below in Section 7.5). A given CSP may participate
(i.e. dedicate nodes) in multiple CSP-communities (contract domains), each of which
deploys a distinct consensus algorithm and ledger.
Using Figure 3, if a customer of CSP-A purchases access to contract-service SCS3
(domain CD3), the customer has visibility only to the ledger for SCS3 (i.e. no access
to ledgers for SCS1 and SCS2).
In the remainder of this paper, we will use the term “CSP community” when discussing the
business and legal aspects of contract services by a CSP, and we shall use “contract domains”
when discussing the technical aspects of the contracts, nodes, ledgers and blockchain.
4.2 Primitives in a Contract Service
The goal of the simple primitives principle is to ensure that smart contract services implement
simple primitive functions that can be used by (i.e. called by) higher layer applications that
contains the complex business logic. Although there are several possible primitives that a
contract-service may use, we believe the following represents the minimal primitives which
must be implemented in a contract domain:
• Asset transfer from one customer to another: This operation moves the ownership of a
virtual asset from one customer to a second customer, both of which must have been
previously onboard by a CSP in the community. This is equivalent to Bitcoin’s payment
to public key (or to a hash of public key).
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• Asset escrow to another customer or to CSP: This operation conditionally moves the
ownership of a virtual asset from one customer to another, or to a CSP in the commu-
nity.
The choice of which the escrow CSP is determined by the operating rules of the CSP
community (e.g. random choice). The escrows are time-limited, meaning that if the
condition fails to be satisfied within the specified time, the asset reverts back to the
customer.
• Asset ingress into blockchain: This operation introduces a regulated virtual asset into
the contract domain, making it available to trade for customers. This event maybe at
the request of a customer of a CSP. This operation is available only to a CSP because
the CSP must validate the legal status of the asset prior to introducing it into the
contract domain. A customer cannot introduce virtual assets on their own.
• Asset egress from blockchain: This operation removes a regulated virtual asset from
the contract domain, making it no longer available to customers. This operation is
available only to a CSP. It marks the ledger to indicate that the asset has moved to
another contract domain and therefore unavailable for further use.
Other contract primitives possible include those pertaining to key management and to
and different types of virtual assets. For example, the key management tasks include: intro-
duction of a customer (new customer) public-key into the contract domain; key-rotation (or
revocation) of customer’s public-key; introduction of a new CSP public-key; key-rotation (or
revocation) of CSP’s public-key; and so on. Asset related tasks include: introduction of a
new asset-type (e.g. new stablecoin, etc.), removal of an existing asset-type; and so on. These
are beyond the current work and are dependent on the contract service and CSP community
that implements the contract service.
4.3 CSP Community Membership Agreement
The computing resource to be allocated by each CSP in a CSP-community, the specifications
of the technical mechanisms (e.g. protocols) to be used in the community, as well as other
operational aspects of the contract domain is expressed in the CSP community membership
agreement document, which is a legally binding contractual agreement. The specifications of
the technical mechanisms for a given contract domain is referred to as the contract domain
profile document.
The community membership agreement may also specify the number of CSP entities
minimally required to implement the contract domain, and the methods to add or subtract
the CSP membership. The agreement may also place a time duration commitment on CSPs,
meaning that once a contract service is made operational by a CSP community the CSPs are
bound to be a member (i.e. allocate nodes and computing resources) until the end of the
duration.
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From a revenue perspective, the CSP community membership agreement must specify
the revenue sharing structure of the CSPs in that community. For example, for each new
customer brought by a CSP entity, the CSP may be mandated to share a certain percentage
of the fees paid that customer. Other revenue sharing models may be based on the number
of transactions transmitted from customers of CSPs.
Although beyond the scope of the current work, the notion of a nodes diversity index could
be defined in the CSP community membership agreement as a measure of the diversity of
the node-implementation technologies [18]. The node diversity index may provide customers
with a tangible indicator of the resiliency of the blockchain network as a whole.
4.4 Computing Resources for Nodes
One of the main decision factors for a CSP as a business entity is the amount of comput-
ing resources it needs to allocate to a contract domain. CSPs have the freedom to im-
plement nodes using various technologies (e.g. bare metal computers; private cloud-based
compute units; public-cloud hosted virtual machines, and so on). An example is shown
in Figure 4. Certain contract domains (CSP communities) may require that the contract-
ledger be readable/writeable only to other CSPs in the same contract domain (i.e. private
contract-ledger), while other contract domains may require that the contract-ledger merely
be member-writeable (but publicly readable). In choosing its node implementation strat-
egy, a CSP must cognizant of these community specific requirements as describe in the CSP
community membership agreement.
For a CSP it is useful to logically divide the functions and resources needed for the
implementation of a contract domain following a layered architecture:
• Contract primitives layer: The constructs at this layer include the contract-code, public-
keys, digital certificates, signed claims (regarding data sources) by CSPs, and others.
• Transaction data layer: The resources at this layer include CPU for processing trans-
actions, storage for historical blocks of confirmed transactions, data sharding mecha-
nisms [19] and other transaction-related events data.
• Consensus mechanisms layer: The resources at this layer include code implementations
of the consensus mechanism chosen by the CSP community for the contract domain
(e.g. Proof of Work [20], Proof of Stake [6, 21], and others [22, 23]).
• Contract policies layer: The constructs at this layer include the policies related to the
contract domain and mechanisms implementing and enforcing these policies.
• Node network layer: The resources at this layer include IP network connectivity, dis-
covery of nodes in the CSP community, topology management, new transaction prop-
agation, and others.
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Figure 4: Example of node implementation strategies for CSPs
• Hardware identification and node attestations layer: In this layer, hardware-related
capabilities information are exposed to higher layer functions as a means to establish
attestations by nodes [5, 24] regarding the trustworthiness of the node implementation.
Figure 4 provides a high level node-centric illustration of the various strategies CSPs may
employ to realize a contract domain. The configuration (i) shows a “bare metal” implemen-
tation of a node where the CSP-A owns and operates the full stack. In configuration (ii)
the CSP-B participates in two contract domains (CD1 and CD2) each associated with two
distinct communities. In configuration (iii), the CSPs employ a third-party cloud provider
that offers multi-tenancy.
4.5 Sources of Value for Virtual Assets: Issuers and Acquirers
The contract service provider model assumes that value associated with virtual assets origi-
nate from outside the contract domain, and that an authoritative legal entity has accorded
a denominated value to a virtual asset prior to the asset being ingested into the contract do-
main (mediated by one or more CSPs in the domain). This philosophy is consistent with our
stated motivations of exploring alternative fee-for-service models that does not rely on utility
tokens for operations fee (i.e. gas fee), which has a number of downsides for customers [7, 8].
The method to determine the value of an asset is outside of the current work, and several
mechanisms have been proposed (e.g. see [25, 26] for a proposed taxonomy).
The function of issuing virtual assets based on real-world assets or other denominational
value is assumed to be performed by an asset Issuer authority. The function converting virtual
assets into its denomination equivalent is assumed to be performed by an asset Acquirer
authority. This assumption is consistent also with a number of exploratory projects that
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Figure 5: Sources of value for virtual assets external to the contract-domain
have been reported (e.g. Project Ubin Phase-5 in Singapore [27]; Project Whitney at the
DTCC [28, 29]).
Figure 5 two general uses cases where two CSPs in two asset compatible contract-domains
(CD1 and CD2) are involved in the transfer of assets. In Figure 5(a) both CSP-A and CSP-
X reside within the same legal jurisdiction J1 (eg. same country) and therefore both CSPs
can rely on the same issuer/acquirer of the virtual asset. When the virtual asset has been
introduced into the contract-domain CD1, it is transferable within CD1 in the usual manner.
When an asset is to be transferred cross-domain from CSP-A to CSP-X, the CSP-X can
easily validate the legal status of the asset to the same issuer/acquirer because domains CD1
and CD2 are under the same jurisdiction J1. In Figure 5(b), the contracts domains CD1
and CD2 are under different jurisdictions J1 and J2 respectively. In this case, when an asset
is to be transferred cross-domain from CSP-A to CSP-X, the CSP-X must rely on its local
issuer/acquirer IA2. As such, the two issuer/acquirers (IA1 and IA2) must have a business
and legal relationship that permits CSPs to query the status of virtual assets prior to transfers
cross-domain.
The interaction model in Figure 5(b) is referred as the 4-corners model, and the term
“issuer” and “acquirer” has been used for nearly two decades in the credit card payments
industry. In the cards payment world, the consumer (card-holder) obtains a credit card from
the Issuer, which is often also a bank or related financial institutions. When the customer
uses the card at a merchant (e.g. to purchase goods at a Point of Service (POS) terminal) the
merchant forwards the transactions details to the Acquirer, which is typically the merchant’s
bank or financial institution. The Acquirer then obtains payment from the Issuer bank (e.g.
debited from the customer’s bank account). This model is called the 4-corners payments
model because of the four entities involved [30]. It has been very successful as evident from
the global reach of the card payments industry. The 4-corners paradigm is useful in the
12
context of a contract domain because (i) it permits the CSP role to be separated from the
role of asset Issuer/Acquirer, and (ii) it permits the notion of global jurisdictions to come
into the picture by recognizing that the issuers of virtual assets may reside in different legal
jurisdictions (countries), and different degrees of compliance to the Travel Rule.
5 Policies for the Contract Domain
Generally speaking, all computer systems and networks operate based on some “rules” or
policies that maybe intrinsic to their design (e.g. hardware level instruction set), or defined
by the user and/or administrator of the system (e.g. file access policies). This is also true
of nodes in a blockchain network. In considering a node as a computer system composed
of hardware and software components, it is helpful to view a node as compute unit made of
logical layers. This separation of functions based on logical layers provides the context within
which to reason about the “rules” or policies applicable to each layer. Each functional layer
may have both non-configurable and configurable parameters, where the later that can be
adjusted by the user/administrator.
In this section we focus on policies in the contract domain, focusing specifically on those
that affect the execution of contracts. Without going into details of a policy state-machine
model, the basic notion is that nodes in a contract domain must react (take action) with
regards to changes in conditions, which may originate externally from the domain.
We use the term contract policies for rules pertaining to virtual assets and contract execu-
tions within a contract domain. These are rules that are inherent within a contract domain,
but which can be triggered by conditions outside the contract domain. To prevent termi-
nology confusion, we use the term community core operating rules in the sense of [31] for
rules and policies that pertain to the operations of the node infrastructure that implement
the contract domain by the CSP community. The core operating rules must be part of the
CSP community membership agreement document (Section 4.3), which is a legally binding
contractual agreement.
5.1 Types of Contract Policies in a Contract Domain
As described earlier, a key goal of the contract simplicity principle to establish a proper
separation between primitive operations encoded in a contract from complex business logic
(Section 7.1). In many cases, business logic become complex and intricate because it incor-
porates business policies relevant to the organization.
The following are some illustrative examples of policies arranged according to their con-
dition/response categories:
• Policies regarding changes to the condition of virtual assets: These are the set of rules
pertaining to actions to be taken by a CSP should there occur a change to the external
status of virtual asset that is currently present within the contract domain.
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Example of an external change to a virtual asset includes the Issuer going out of business
or temporarily halting operations (e.g. Issuer under legal investigation). In this case,
the contract domain that has customers holding this virtual asset may choose to also
temporarily cease all transactions related to that virtual asset.
• Policies regarding changes to the condition of customers: These are the set of rules
pertaining to actions to be taken by a CSP should a change occur to the status a
customer.
For example, a customer of a CSP may face legal issues that necessitate the customer’s
assets in the contract domain being frozen temporarily. Faced with a legal notification
from the relevant authority (e.g. SAR warrant) the CSP community may then tem-
porarily suspend the customer’s account and/or issue an asset-lock on the customer’s
assets on the contract-ledger (see Section 6.4).
• Policies regarding changes to the condition of CSP membership in a community: These
are the set of rules pertaining to actions to be taken by a CSP in response to changes
in the membership composition of its CSP community.
For example, assuming that a CSP is a VASP under the Travel Rule [16], if a CSP has
its VASP business license revoked by the relevant authorities then other CSPs in that
community must respond as defined in the policies (e.g. ignore all new transactions
and block-confirmations from the revoked CSP).
• Policies regarding cross-domain transactions: These are the set of rules pertaining to
asset transfers involving an external contract domain.
For example, a customer of a CSP may wish to have their virtual assets transferred
out of the current contract-domain to a different contract-domain in a different CSP
community. In cases such as this, the policies of the contract domain may require the
asset to be temporarily suspended in contract domain until it has been successfully
moved to the external contract-domain.
5.2 Core Operating Rules for CSP Communities
The core operating rules for a CSP community defines the rules of interaction of the nodes of
the CSPs in the community across the functional layers of the nodes. As mentioned previously,
we view the functional layers of a node’s resources to consist of the contract primitives layer,
the transactions data layer, consensus layer, the network layer and the hardware identification
and attestation layer (see Section 4.4).
Given the decentralized transaction processing model of many blockchain networks, it is
necessary to view these core rules as being applied to distributed resources with distributed
policy enforcement model. One key component of distributed policy enforcement is the set
privileges parameters [32] that take into account the actors/roles, contract operations, asset
types and jurisdictions.
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Figure 6: Policy decision points and enforcement points in a decentralized topology
Figure 6 attempts to illustrate this distributed policy enforcement model where the “poli-
cies” here are the core operating rules in the CSP community. The nodes as the endpoints
which enforce the core rules must also be equipped to perform decision-making on their own
– with an assumed regular synchronization to the central policy-administration point [33].
Thus, the nodes as endpoints must be equipped with both PDP and PEP capabilities (Pol-
icy Decision Point, and Policy Enforcement Point) [34, 35]. The core rules and subsequent
updates to those rules must originate from the governance organization of the CSP commu-
nity. In Figure 6, a centralized entity called the Policy Administration Point (PAP) for the
contract domain distributes these rule-updates.
5.3 Policy-Driven Systems: A Brief History
The notion of policy-driven access control to resources is not a new idea, and has in fact
evolved since the early days of the networked organizations over three decades ago. Tradi-
tional Enterprise IT infrastructures demarcate access to resources (e.g. file-servers, printers,
network elements, etc.) through the notion of access control domains [36, 37]. Thus, all
subjects, roles, objects (resources), actions, and rules (policies) are defined for the entities
and the services that reside within the access control domain. Subjects with privileges in
multiple domains are accorded different roles when accessing resources in those domains.
The differentiation between centralized and distributed networks is important from the
perspective of the development of privileges architecture that govern access to resources ac-
cessible to participants in the network [38]. Within traditional enterprise networked sys-
tems, policy-driven access control evolved in enterprise organizations starting in the 1990s.
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As shared resources (e.g. file servers) within an enterprise were made available within the
network (i.e. Local Area Networks (LAN)), the issue of controlling access to these shared
resources became increasingly crucial for the survival of the enterprise network, and the
enterprise as a whole.
The access control model that became predominant in enterprise networks was the Bell
and LaPadula Model (BLP) [39]. In this model, access control is defined in terms of subjects
possessing different security levels, seeking access to objects (i.e. system resources). Thus, for
example, in the BLP model a subject (e.g. user) is permitted to access an object (e.g. file)
if the subject’s security level (e.g. “Top Secret”) is higher than security level of the object
(e.g. “Secret”). The notion of roles or capacities was added to this model, leading to the
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model. Here, as a further refinement of the BLP model,
a subject (user) may have multiple roles or capacities within a given organization. Thus,
when the subject is seeking access to an object, he or she must indicate the role within which
the request is being made. The formal model for RBAC was defined by NIST in 1992 [40].
The same RBAC model applies also to corporate resources attached to the corporate
LAN. Corporate security policies was therefore expressed in terms of access-control policies
as applied to subjects in certain roles seeking access to objects residing within a given ad-
ministrative domain. This problem was often referred to as Authentication, Authorization
and Audit (AAA) in the 1990s [34]. Part of the AAA model developed during the 1990s was
an abstraction of functions pertaining to deciding access rules, from functions pertaining to
enforcing them. Entities which authored policies were referred to as Policy Administration
Points (PAP), those who decided on access-rules were denoted as Policy Decision Points
(PDP), while entities that enforced these access-rules were denoted as Policy Enforcement
Points (PEP)[35]. This policy-based access control model is foundational to many systems de-
ployed within enterprises today, where privileges management is performed typically through
directory services (e.g. Microsoft Active Directory [41]) that maintains the list of valid em-
ployees of the enterprise. This approach is very common in mid to large organizations,
including notably those in the financial industry.
6 Interoperability of Contract Domains
The notion of a CSP-community is based in the successful model of Internet Service Provider
(ISP) communities, which implement a number of proven design principles of the Internet
Architecture [3, 4]. Two of the fundamental principles are autonomous system (AS) principle
and the end-to-end principle.
Each CSP-community implementing a contract domain is an autonomous system in the
sense that the nodes of the CSPs can operate independently from other blockchain networks.
The contract domain observes the end-to-end principle by externalizing the source of value
of virtual assets to the end-points. Thus, the contract domain is oblivious to the value or
monetary aspect of the virtual assets flowing within contract domain. This is in contrast to
blockchain platforms that operate based on users purchasing tokens that are endogenous to
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Figure 7: Overview of transfers of virtual assets across two contract-domains
the blockchain [42], thereby effecting platform-capture for its users.
The Internet in reality is a “stitched” collection of islands of IP networks owned by ISPs,
and they are able to interoperate at the technical level due to standardized protocols and
interoperate at the business and legal level due to peering agreements (bilateral agreements
and group-agreements). Similarly, CSP communities will need to develop peering agreements
with other CSP communities in order for virtual assets to be able to enter and leave contract-
domains in an efficient and regulated manner.
6.1 Cross-Domain Transfers: Basic Requirements
The constrained authorship principle (see Section 7.2) means that customers (end-users) are
prohibited from publishing their own contracts onto the nodes of the contract domain. Only
the CSPs in the group are permitted to author and publish the contract primitives. This
has the advantage that control over a smart contract [43] is unambiguously in the hands of
the publishing CSP in the CSP-community. This means that quality and safety of smart
contracts is the clear responsibility of the CSP-community as whole. This, in turn, provides
a sound basis to begin addressing the challenges around cross-domain asset transfers.
There are a number of functional requirements for cross-domain transfers of virtual assets
between two contract-domains:
• Asset validation before transfer: There must be some means for the recipient entity (in
the destination contract-domain) to validate the asset type and legal status prior to
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engaging with the transfer. This function is represented as the asset attester/verifier
function in Figure 5 and in Figure 7).
• Commitment atomicity: Cross-domain asset transfers must employ an atomic com-
mitment scheme that prevents (detect) the same asset being present on two contract-
domains (e.g. using 2-Phase Commit Protocol (2PC) [44, 45]).
There are several efforts today to reuse the atomic commitment protocols from the
field of distributed databases and concurrency control (e.g. see [46]). The overall aim
of many of these schemes is to interpret (re-cast) the ACID properties (atomicity, con-
sistency, isolation, durability) [47] of these protocols to the context of asset transfers,
at least for unidirectional transfers (nb. database transactions are typically unidirec-
tional). Additional properties (e.g. safety, liveliness) have also been suggested (e.g.
cross-chain deals [48]).
• Transfer non-repudiability: There must be sufficient evidence regarding the finality and
settlement at both contract domains to obviate disputes by either a CSP or a customer
(in one or both domains).
Evidence of settlement can consist of the combinations of confirmed transactions on
the blocks on both contract-ledgers, local signed-logs by the nodes handling the cross-
domain transfer, logs from the commitment layer, and so on. Evidence needed for
disputes between two CSP-communities must be specified in their peering agreement
document.
• Policy federation as part of peering agreements: Contract domains need compatible poli-
cies along several axes, including: (i) the type of regulated asset being transferred; (ii)
the legal jurisdiction of operations of the contract-domain; (iii) the type of operations
permitted (e.g. unidirectional unconditional transfers only, conditional transfer, etc),
(iv) the agreed commitment protocol and non-repudiation protocol to be used (or ne-
gotiated from a common standard list), and (v) the configuration of the nodes handling
the transfers on both sides based on the node-device attestation evidence (see [24, 49]
for a discussion on node device identities and node attestations).
• Publication of peering-points: Similar to BGP-routers in IP networks, a given CSP
community implementing a contract-domain must determine the peering-points to be
used in cross-domain asset transfers. The peering-points configuration and location
(e.g. IP address and port-number) should part of the peering agreement. CSPs should
generally standardize on a common notation and configuration for peering-points as it
helps all CSPs to know the first port of call for remote (foreign) CSPs.
6.2 Gateway Nodes
The method used by a contract domain to select the node in the domain that will perform
the cross-domain transfer is determined by the configuration rules in the domain’s core op-
erational policies. Some consensus protocol (e.g. in the family of BFT protocols [23, 22])
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implement a leader election mechanism that chooses one node out of the network to perform
the designated computation (e.g. forging a block in Ethereum). In the context of asset trans-
fers that involve an external or foreign contract-domain, we refer to that chosen node as the
gateway node.
However, there are several possible strategies with regards to determining the gateway-
nodes that will perform cross-domain transfers. For example, a CSP community may require
each of its CSP members to nominate one or more of their respective nodes as gateway nodes,
thereby reducing the number of possible gateway nodes from the total population of nodes in
that community. These handful of gateway nodes can be equipped with special capabilities
(e.g. trusted hardware [24]) to deal with the cross-domain transfer.
The gateway node in an origin contract-domain must use the published well-known peering
point in the destination contract-domain to communicate its intent to commence a cross-
domain transfer. The endpoint in the destination contract-domain may either handle the
call itself (if it is equipped and authorized to do so), it could redirect the call to the relevant
gateway-node in that domain. Figure 7 provides a high level illustration of some of the
functions and capabilities needed for cross-domain asset transfers.
6.3 Identifiers for Contract Domains and VASP Numbers
Each autonomous systems (AS) in the Internet is allocated a globally unique AS-number.
For example, in the United States this task is managed by the American Registry for Internet
Numbers (ARIN) [50]. For the EU the organization is RIPE, for Africa it is AFRINIC, for
Asia-Pacific it is APNIC and so on [51].
Today the VASP and virtual asset industry globally has yet to agree on a common VASP
numbering scheme and customer identification scheme. The notion of a unique VASP number
has been proposed in [52, 53], while other mechanisms have been contemplated, such as using
the VASP’s Legal Entity Identifier (LEI) [54] within the VASP KYC-Certificate [55]. In the
current work we assume that a contract-domain has a globally unique identifier that allows
it to be distinguished easily from other contract-domains and VASPs.
When a customer of a CSP in a contract-domain invokes the asset transfer contract using
a beneficiary address (public-key) or PayID address [56] that is not an entity (customer)
in the same contract-domain, then an address resolver mechanism is needed to map from
the beneficiary address to the contract-domain (blockchain network) where the beneficiary
resides. This topic is discussed further in [49].
6.4 Asset Locking during Cross-Domain Transfers
A requirements for cross-domain asset transfers is preventing double-spend of the asset (inad-
vertently or otherwise) on the part of the customer who owns it. In this case, a double-spend
would consist of a customer requesting a cross-domain transfer of their asset while at the same
using the same asset in a different transaction (e.g. locally in the same contract domain). In
the current model, cross-domain transfers are performed by nodes belonging to CSPs in the
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CSP community.
One approach to solve this dilemma is for the processing node (gateway node) to tem-
porarily lock the asset while the transfer process is underway. The notion of “locking” is
borrowed from the classic field of database transaction and concurrency-control [57, 44, 45].
In transactional database systems, locking techniques are used to “mark” a data item (e.g.
database row) as undergoing an update by one process. Other processes are unable to access
(write to) the data item until the lock is released.
Given the diversity of blockchain transaction processing models (e.g. UTXO in Bitcoin;
external-owned accounts and smart contract accounts in Ethereum; etc.) we believe that
(i) the contract-ledger is the only reliable shared-state and synchronization method for all
the nodes in a blockchain network [58, 59], and therefore that (ii) the lock-state information
for cross-domain transfers must be recorded on the contract-ledger so that the lock-state is
visible to all nodes in the same contract-domain. From an audit and security perspective, the
recording of lock/unlock information on the contract-ledger provides the benefit of historical
traceability of cross-domain events in the case of disputes between CSP-communities.
The specific lock/unlock mechanism is dependent on the cross-domain atomic commit-
ment protocol used by gateway nodes. However, in general they must perform the following
tasks:
• Asset locked transaction: This transaction marks an asset associated with a customer
public-key as being in a locked-state and therefore will not be processed by other nodes.
A time duration may be set in the transaction header denoting the duration of validity of
the lock, after which the lock automatically expires and the asset considered unlocked.
• Asset unlock transaction: This is an explicit unlock transaction that marks the asset as
being “free” (unlocked state) on the ledger. An asset-unlock transaction must match
an existing asset-lock transaction, and it is typically issued by the same entity (CSP
node) that issued the lock. The purpose of an explicit unlock is to terminate a lock
before the expiration of its timer. This feature is useful for cases such as an aborted
cross-domain transaction (e.g. abort request from customer).
• Asset lock-committed transaction: This transaction marks a virtual asset as being hence-
forth permanently unavailable due to the asset exiting (transferred out of) the contract-
domain. Typically, this transaction must refer to (include a hash of) a previous asset-
locked transaction confirmed on the contract-ledger. It may include an identifier that
points to the new home (destination contract-domain) of the virtual asset [1, 5].
Although the specific locking mechanism is beyond the current work, in general lock/unlock
transactions must include at least the following parameters: the identifier of the asset being
locked, the address (public key) of the current holder (customer), the timestamp value (or
timer), and the hash of the confirmed transaction on the contract-ledger where the asset was
last used. Similarly, an asset unlock transaction must include a hash of the earlier confirmed
asset locked transaction.
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Figure 8: Summary of flows in a cross-domain transfer
6.5 Example of Flows in a Cross-Domain Transfer
An example of the flows that occur in a cross-domain transfer between two contract domains
in shown in Figure 8. The gateway nodes are shown as G1 (owned by CSP-B) in domain CD1,
and G2 (owned by CSP-X) in domain CD2 respectively. Alice is the originator, while Bob
is the beneficiary. Since gateway G1 belongs to CSP-B, the CSP-B is the Originator-VASP.
Similarly, CSP-X that owns G2 is the Beneficiary-VASP.
The transfer consists of four (4) general phases, including the commitment protocol em-
bedded in the flows:
Phase 1: Initiation of transaction and policy validation. There are a number of pre-transfer
tasks that need to occur in this phase:
• The processing node (gateway G1) must locate the correct destination contract
domain CD2 where the beneficiary (Bob) is thought to reside.
• Gateway G1 must validate that gateway G2 is owned by a registered CSP (VASP),
and vice versa.
• Gateway G1 must request gateway G2 to seek consent from the beneficiary (Bob)
to receive the asset to be transferred. This protects the beneficiary and G2 (CSP-
X) by giving them exculpatory evidence. An explicit consent from a beneficiary
is a requirement in some jurisdictions (e.g. see FINMA [60]).
• Gateway G2 must validate that the virtual asset to be transferred from G1 is
compatible with the core operating rules of the contract domain CD2.
• The gateway G2 must validate the legal status of this asset to its Asset Is-
suer/Acquirer. (In the previous Figure 7, this is shown as Line-2 from G1 to
21
G2, and Line-3 from G2 to its Asset Issuer/Acquirer).
• If all is well, gateway G2 transmits an acknowledgment to G1 that the transfer
can proceed.
Phase 2: Local locking of asset. In this phase the gateway G1 issues a local asset-locked
transaction on ledger L1 to the asset in question. This prevents double-spending on
the part of the originator. Optionally, gateway G2 may indicate an incoming asset by
issuing a candidate-lock on its ledger L2. The candidate-lock is not binding, but serves
as an audit trail in case of disputes between the two CSP communities.
Phase 3: Preparation to commit. In this phase gateway G1 acting as the coordinator in
the 2PC protocol [44, 45] signals readiness to commit to gateway G2.
Phase 4: Finalization of commit. In this phase the gateway G1 as coordinator signals to
gateway G2 to perform the global commitment on ledger L2. Gateway G1 then issues
an asset lock-committed transaction on ledger L1 to close its previous asset-locked
transaction in Phase 2.
Gateway G2 records the new asset on its local ledger L2, assigning it to the public-key
of the beneficiary Bob. If G2 employed a candidate-lock transaction on L2 previously in
Phase 2, then G2 can also close that transaction with its own asset-locked transaction
on ledger L2.
The astute reader may recognize that Phase 2 to Phase 4 constitutes a variant of the 2PC
commitment protocol, often referred to as 3PC (i.e. three phase commit). In distributed
databases this occurs through the use of a commit-prepare message followed by a global-
commit message sent from the coordinator (node G1) to all recipient (in this case, node G2).
The topic of reliability of commitment protocols have been extensively addressed in various
literature over the past two decades (e.g. see [57]).
7 The Contract Services Model: Design Principles
The contract service provider (CSP) model is based on the following design principles that
takes into account code complexity considerations and the provider’s deployment considera-
tions:
(a) Contract simplicity principle: Each smart contract should implement a simple and
modular well-defined function, following classic object-oriented design principles. This
is also referred to as the decentralized primitives principle.
(b) Constrained authorship principle: Each contract must be made available only by a
contract service provider (CSP) entity within the group of CSPs.
(c) Node diversity principle: A contract service blockchain network must employ a diverse
node-technology implementations and be owned/operated by a diverse set of providers.
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(d) Mediated oracle principle: Any representation of value that originates from outside the
contract service (contract domain) must enter (be introduced) into the contract service
through the mediation of a contract service provider.
(e) Opaque ledgers assumption: Any cross-chain or cross-domain asset transfer protocol
must be designed based on the assumption that the ledgers of the respective blockchains
are not externally readable/writeable.
We discuss these design principles in the following.
7.1 Simple Primitives Principle
The goal of this principle is to re-orient the notion of DApps (decentralized applications) into
the proper separation between primitive operations from complex business logic. Following
the classic object-oriented design philosophy, complex applications are created using layers
of modular objects, where each object implements rudimentary functions. This means that
smart contracts must implement simple primitive functions that can be used (i.e. called) by
higher layer applications, which may be complex and involve access to off-chain data sources.
Such business applications should be implemented off-chain, with APIs providing access to
the on-chain primitives.
This principle seeks to address the following challenges:
• Cost of on-chain operations: The use of contracts that implement simple primitive func-
tions means that the number (cost) of on-chain operations is limited. This factor is an
important consideration for CSPs who choose to use shared platforms (e.g. Ethereum)
in implementing their nodes.
• Interoperability at the protocol layer: The use of simple primitives in one blockchain
system provides the highest likelihood that semantically near-identical primitives are
also used in other blockchain systems.
• Privacy of business logic and data flows: Many organizations in the financial sector
and other industries have developed complex business applications that often embody
business decision-making strategies. Some of these applications can be considered pro-
prietary and some may access internal data-sources (e.g. private data stores in the
organization).
By employing simple contract primitives that record shared state on the ledger but
placing sensitive application-logic off-chain, organizations can retain their intellectual
property while adding to the application’s integrations capabilities.
7.2 Constrained Authorship Principle
The goal of the constrained authorship principle is to address the quality and provenance
issues with regards to smart contracts. In many permissionless blockchains today, the identity
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of the author of a smart contract is unknown because the contract is bound only to a public-
key.
Although the paradigm of permitting anyone to anonymously publish a contract on a
blockchain platform (e.g. Ethereum) – as long as they pay the operations fees (i.e. gas) – may
be beneficial for the platform owners, this paradigm is unrealistic from business organizations’
security and survivability. Most (all) medium to large Enterprise organizations have strict
access policies with regards to the resources accessible to employees on the corporate network.
Similarly, Internet access providers and ISPs maintain the availability and uptime of their
network by strictly controlling access to the network elements (e.g. routers, switches, VPNs,
etc). Demarcating the physical boundary of an ISP network (which is also a legal boundary)
is therefore core to the business survivability of the ISP.
In practical terms, the constrained authorship principle means that for a given CSP
community sharing a contract-ledger, only smart contracts (set of primitives) authored by a
CSP member of the community is permitted to be published on the blockchain (i.e. on all the
nodes and shared ledger). This has the advantage that contracts can be carefully designed,
tested and implemented by CSPs within the contained environment of the contract domain.
This principle seeks to address the following challenges:
• Demarcation of computational boundary, and business & legal responsibilities: Simi-
lar to ISPs who need to demarcate their physical network boundary, contract service
providers (CSP) need to demarcate their computational boundary as well as their busi-
ness and legal liabilities. By limiting the origins and authorship of contracts to only
CSP entities, the CSP-community members have a clear demarcation of their respon-
sibilities to their customers.
This is in radical contrast to the permissionless philosophy that leads to overall blockchain
performance unpredictability and the need for users to verify every contract that the
user wishes to call (i.e. verify manually or using formal verification tools).
• Quality and safety of smart contracts: Contract service providers are responsible for
the functional quality and safety of their smart contract. This permits customers to
make use the contract for the appropriate asset types, with assurance that the contract
has been tested, analyzed and staged by the authoring CSP.
• Code provenance and authorship identification: Most (all) business applications have
known authorship, and therefore known code provenance. In contrast, many smart
contracts permissionless blockchains today are of unknown origin and is “posted” on
the nodes of the blockchain using a public-key whose ownership is unidentifiable. These
anonymous smart contracts are simply too risky for many legitimate businesses.
7.3 Node Diversity Principle
The Internet consists of a number of autonomous systems that together provide IP commu-
nications end-to-end from the sender to receiver. The diversity of ISPs and the networks that
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form the Internet provide one of the key strength of the Internet. A similar strategy is needed
for contract domains, where CSP diversity and node-technology diversity [18] provides the
best strategy for survivability of the blockchain network as a whole.
Cyberattacks on blockchain networks can range from crude network-level denial attacks
(i.e. DDOS attacks), to more sophisticated attacks based on the manipulation of consensus
(e.g. in the case of anonymous nodes) and of smart contracts. Although theft of keys have
occurred primarily on client endpoints (i.e. wallets), nodes (e.g. mining or forging nodes)
which hold private-keys can also be a target of attacks.
This principle seeks to address the following challenges:
• Node implementation diversity: The uniform implementation of the node software stack
in homogeneous platforms (e.g. Bitcoin, Ethereum) means that malware designed to
target that specific software stack will affect all nodes in the network.
• Service provider diversity: Platforms that are directly or indirectly controlled (owned)
by one or few dominating entities leads to poor levels of services overtime.
7.4 Mediated Oracle Principle
Smart contracts today are “blind” to data sources that are external to the platform that
implement the smart contract. As such, developers of blockchain platforms have resorted
to naming external data sources as oracles of truth – a reference to the Oracle of Delphi in
Greek mythology. In practice, this means that any external data must be made present on
the ledger in order for a smart contract to read and act upon it. Since the same copy of
a smart contract is present on all nodes, this means that the invocation of any copy of the
smart contract must read the same data item on the local copy of the ledger.
However, a key issue here is in deciding which external source of data is “trustworthy” to
the user (caller) of the smart contract to begin with. This is one of the seemingly inherent
contradictions of the “trustless” blockchain model: on one hand no single entity is trusted
to execute the smart contract (hence the decentralized copies of the smart contract on each
node); on the other hand, any meaningful use of smart contracts requires the importation
of a digital representation of the real-world asset issued by a centralized “oracle” entity. It
is this centralized entity that “binds” the digital representation to the real-world asset by
cryptographically signing the assertion data-structure (e.g. signed JSON file, signed digital
certificate, etc). The centralized entity stands behind its assertion (by signing it) and thereby
takes-on legal liability.
At the heart of the oracle problem is the inherent limitations of the smart contracts
abstraction [58, 59]. The abstraction is based on the classic object-oriented programming
constructs of methods and local data (i.e. scoped variables), where a special constructor
method instantiates (in memory) the methods (local functions) and the variables (local data)
defined by the class of the object. When this programming abstraction is mapped onto a
multi-node blockchain system – as is the case with Ethereum and Solidity [11] – with a shared
global state (i.e. blocks of the ledger) and shared code visibility (i.e. copy of smart contract
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is on every node), the limitations of the method/scope-variable paradigm become readily
apparent. Just as methods (local functions) in an object is limited in its visibility to data
defined in its scope (i.e. data in its local memory), a smart contract is limited in its visibility
to data found on the shared ledger. As far as a smart contract is concerned, anything not on
the ledger does not exist.
The principle of mediated oracles seeks to address the practical limitations of the current
form of oracles by ensuring that at least one CSP in a contract domain is verifying the
truthfulness of the external oracle’s assertions (virtual assets) prior to introducing the virtual
asset into the contract domain:
• All oracle assertions pre-validated by CSP: Any digital representations of assets asserted
by an external oracle must be validated a CSP before the CSP introduces it into the
contract domain shared by the CSP community. A customer of a CSP seeking to
move their virtual assets into a contract domain must request its CSP to perform this
importation.
The CSP must (i) validate the source-authenticity of the virtual asset and its legal
status, (ii) validate the expiration date of the virtual asset (if any), and (iii) obtain
sufficient evidence that the virtual asset is not used in other blockchain systems.
• All oracle assertions co-signed by CSP upon entry: The CSP that validates the digital
representations of assets (asserted by an external oracle) must also digitally sign the
assertion when introducing it into the CSP community. This ensures liability lies with
the CSP, and therefore deters the CSP from malicious behavior.
7.5 Opaque Ledgers Assumption
The structure of a contract service provider (CSP) community is based on the classic notion
of a bounded IP network routing domain and observes two fundamental principles of the
Internet architecture. These two principles are: (i) networks as bounded autonomous system
(AS), and (ii) communications-context (meaning) as a higher layer function that exists at the
edges end-to-end [3, 4]. These two principles represent pillars of the Internet architecture that
has allowed the Internet to grow through the addition of independent autonomous networks
where the interior of each network is opaque to the next network [1].
A key aspect of the autonomous system principle in the Internet architecture is that
routing-data (e.g. interior route advertisements) belonging to an ISP is opaque (invisible) to
other ISPs and external entities. This provides the freedom for an ISP to innovate within
the confines of its own network (e.g. using new routing protocols and routers), while not
impacting other ISPs. The ISP-to-ISP interaction occurs through the deployment of an
exterior inter-domain routing protocol (e.g. BGPv4) that acts as a standardized interface
between networks.
We believe a similar design assumption is needed for contract-domains and blockchain
networks. We refer to this assumption as the opaque ledgers assumption, which states that any
cross-chain or cross-domain asset transfer protocol must be designed based on the assumption
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that the ledgers of the respective blockchains are not externally readable/writeable. A well-
designed protocol that permits asset transfer across two blockchains with opaque ledgers will
invariably work also for blockchains with non-opaque ledgers.
Note that the opaque ledgers assumption has implications on contract-level cross-chain
conditionals, such as cross-chain hash-locks [61] and time-locks – which assume that the
ledgers on both sides of the cross-chain transfer are readable/writeable (e.g. see [62, 46, 63,
64]). This means that for the CSP model and contract domains, any conditional-transfer
constructs must be an artifact of the upper layer application that implements the business
logic as mentioned earlier.
8 Conclusions
Today there is a great interest on the possible use of digital currencies as the national level, in
the form of Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDC) and fiat-backed Stablecoins. There are
a number of possible strategies to implement CBDCs, including a non-blockchain approach
following the classic Chaum design (e.g. GNU Taler).
Today the lack of interoperability among popular blockchain platforms and the rising
cost of transactions on platforms employing the gas-fee model may discourage the use of
blockchain-based solutions for CBDCs. As such, alternative models are needed that can
retain the technological benefits of blockchain systems while using a different fee-for-service
business model that does not rely on the tokenization of operations.
In this paper have proposed the Contract Service Provider (CSP) model as one such
alternative.
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